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In Re the Marlborough Sounds foreshore and seabed: The Effects of the 
Maori Land Court Decision on the Crown, Maori and the Public of New 
Zealand. 1 
Angela Huppert 300031301 
I INTRODUCTION 
The foreshore is a precious part of the identity of each New Zealander. Most New 
Zealanders have grown up and lived by or near the coast and have experienced its 
prestine beauty and invigorating character. To various extents, each New Zealander has a 
highly treasured relationship with the coast and few would care to find themselves 
suddenly unable to access the beaches and sea that surrounds them. However, the current 
situation of open access to the coastline is in serious danger as a result of the recent 
Maori Land Court decision In re Marlborough Sounds foreshore and seabed (1997) 22A 
Nelson, Minute Book 1. The ground-breaking ruling of the court has raised the possibility 
that large areas of the foreshore and seabed of the Marlborough Sounds, and indeed the 
rest of the New Zealand coastline, may be subject to unextinguished Maori customary 
title. The decision has shaken the general presumption in New Zealand that the foreshore 
is vested in the Crown for the benefit of the public.2 Furthermore, it has questioned the 
Crown's legal title to the foreshore which currently rests in Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach 
[1963] 1 NZLR 461. As a result, the Crown's territorial claim to the foreshore stands on 
very unstable grounds. The potential ramifications of this situation are far-reaching, not 
only for the public and their current rights to the foreshore, but for the Crown and Maori 
alike. This paper will identify the consequences of this potential transfer in ownership of 
the foreshore and suggest that, whilst the case is a positive step fowards in terms of the 
recognition of Maori customary rights, the potential adverse effects for the Crown and the 
New Zealand public should not be underestimated or ignored. 
II DEFINITION OF THE 'FORESHORE' 
The definition of the foreshore has been the subject of much judicial consideration.3 
According to Richard Boast in The Foreshore, the 'foreshore' has a distinct meaning in 
English and New Zealand law: "it is a piece of land, the intertidal zone, the area between 
high water and low water mark. "4 
1 
Although the case deals with the ownership of the seabed, this paper is confined to the decisions made by 
Hingston J regarding the ownership of the foreshore . 
2 "Foreshore Appeal disturbs law experts" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 23 March 1998, 9 
["Foreshore appeal disturbs"]. The article notes that until the Marlborough Sounds case, "most had 
r,resumed the land had been well and truly vested in the Crown". 
See for example Attorney general v Findlay [ 1919] NZLR 513, 518 and the cases cited therein. 
4 Richard P Boast The Foreshore. Rangahaua Whanui National Theme Q, (First Release, Waitangi 
Tribunal, Rangahaua Whanui Series, November 1996, 6.["The Foreshore "] 
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The definition adopted m the proceedings of the Marlborough Sounds case was as 
follows: 
"Foreshore: such parts of the bed, shore, or banks of the sea or a river as are 
covered or uncovered by the flow and ebb of the tide at mean spring tides" 5 
III OWNERSHIP OF THE FORESHORE: EVOLUTION OF NEW ZEALAND 
LAW 
Before advancing into a discussion of the facts of Marlborough Sounds and the 
implications thereof, it is essential to clarify the current legal position of the foreshore in 
order to fully appreciate the impact Marlborough Sounds will have on both existing law 
and circumstances pertaining to the foreshore. 
A Foreshore ownership: the common law and its application in New Zealand 
1 The common law position 
The general principle at common law is that the Crown is prima facie the presumptive 
owner of the foreshore by prerogative right. 6 The first conception of the prima facie title 
of the Crown arose in the tenth or eleventh year of Queen Elizabeth 1568-9, when Mr 
Thomas Digges wrote a treatise entitled "Proofs of the Queen's interest in Lands left by 
the sea and the salt shores thereof". This treatise first invented and set up the claim of the 
Crown to the foreshore 7 and was adopted by Lord Hale in 1667 in his "Treatise de Jure 
maris et brachiorum ejusdem ". Lord Hale concluded: 
"The shore is that ground that is between the ordinary high water and low water 
mark. This doth prima facie and of common right belong to the King, both in the shore of 
the sea and the shore of the arms of the sea".8 
More recently, the common law position became a well-established rule, well supported 
by authority such as the decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v Emerson9 
where Lord Herschell said: 
5Submissions of the Crown in the Maori Land Court of New Zealand, Te Waipounamu District, Appln No 
17249, in the matter of Te Hau Ihu o Te Waka A Maui Region. Crown law Office (HM Aikman, N J 
Baird),4.[ "Submissions of the Crown"] This was the definition proposed by the Crown, taken from s 2 
Foreshore and Seabed Endowment Revesting Act 1991. There do exist other definitions which set the high 
water mark at the mean high water mark (see for instance Halsbury vol 49(2) para 4, "high water mark of 
medium tides" and the definition in s 35 of the Crown Grants Act 1908 which fixes the boundary at "high 
water mark at ordinary tides". S 2 of the Resource Management Act 1991 defines the foreshore as "any 
land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the tide at mean spring tides .. ". The practical effect of 
such differences is not significant. 
6 This is a presumptive title which can be displaced by proof of a Crown grant or continuous occupation. 
7 
Moore, Stuart A, A History of the Foreshore and Law Relating Thereto. London, Steven & Haynes, Law 
Publishers, Bell Yard, Temple Bar, 1888,182. ["A History of the Foreshore"] 
8 A History of the Foreshore above n 7,378. 
9 Attorney General v Emerson [ 1891] AC 646. 
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"It is beyond dispute that the Crown is prima facie entitled to every part of 
the foreshore between high and low water mark, and that a subject can 
only establish a title to any given part of the foreshore, either by proving 
an express grant thereof from the Crown, or by giving evidence from 
which such grant, though not capable of being produced will be 
presumed." 
2 The New Zealand position 
The question is, whether these common law principles have been carried through into 
New Zealand. In the Kauwaerenga10 case in 1870 the Crown submitted that on 
establishment of British rule in New Zealand in 1840, the common law presumption of 
prima facie ownership of the foreshore took effect in New Zealand. Fenton CJ rejected 
this proposition and rendered the argument "entirely inconsistent with and destructive of 
all claims of this character." 11 The Crown has nevertheless continued to rely on this 
common law position and in In re the Ninety Mile Beach case in 1963, the Crown 
followed the same argument they submitted in Kauwaerenga. However, the Court of 
Appeal doubted the validity of the Crown position suggesting it would amount to 
depriving the Maoris of their customary rights over the foreshore by a "side wind."
12 
Thus, whatever the basis for the Crown's claim to the foreshore, it cannot rest merely on 
the adoption of the common law. The Court of Appeal in In re the Ninety Mile Beach, 
devised other rationales for the Crown's title to the foreshore which constitute the legal 
base of the Crown's claim today. However, as suggested by Hingston Jin Marlborough 
Sounds, these rationales are arguably "insufficient" 13and unlikely to withstand close 
scrutiny. Furthermore, no statute in New Zealand explicitly vests the foreshore in the 
Crown. The Crown's title to the foreshore thus rests on very unstable legal foundations. 
This is not only a matter of concern for the Crown, but as will be suggested, for the 
general public of New Zealand. 
3 Conflict with Maori customary title 
The reason the foreshore is a particular issue in New Zealand law is because the relevant 
rules of the common law (as they have been applied and developed in New Zealand) have 
effectively vested this significant area in the Crown. This position arguably infringes 
upon Maori customary rights to the foreshore, which Maori firmly believe exist by virtue 
of continuous occupation of the foreshore areas. 14 The foreshore was, and is, of vital 
importance to Maori. The position taken by Maori is that Maori society possessed its own 
body of law relating to 'ownership' of the foreshore and to this day they remain the 
1° Kauwaerenga [1870] 4 Hauraki MB, 236 
11 Kauwaerenga above n 10,236 per Fenton CJ, cited in Jn re the NinetyBeach [1963] NZLR 461,471, per 
North J 
12 In re the Ninety Mile Beach[l 963} I NZLR 416, 478 ,per Gresson J. 
13 Jn re The Marlborough Sounds foreshore and seabed (December I 997) 22A Nelson, Minute Book I, 5. 
14 This statement is supported by the mere existence of claims to the foreshore such as the case at point, 
Marlborough Sounds. 
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owners of those parts of the foreshore which they are entitled to under the Treaty of 
Waitangi 1840. 15 It is this conflict of ownership rights which has been the foundation of 
legal issues arising between the Crown and Maori in the course of New Zealand legal 
history. 
IV IN RE MARLBOROUGH SOUNDS FORESHORE AND SEABED 
A The importance of the case 
The Marlborough Sounds case has shocked most New Zealanders who assume that the 
beaches and foreshore of New Zealand are public property- or in legal terms, Crown land. 
Those who are aware of the precarious legal position of the Crown's title to the foreshore 
have also been somewhat disturbed. 16 
The Maori Land Court decision is the first judgement to doubt the legal basis of the 
Crown's title which rests in In re the Ninety Mile Beach. The decision criticises the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeal and restores jurisdiction to the Maori Land Court to 
investigate titles to areas of the foreshore which have not previously been the subject of 
an investigation. Thus the whole legal status of the foreshore is effectively brought into 
question. It is possible that the Crown may no longer be the rightful owner of our coast, 
and instead the foreshore may well be the property of private individuals who prove to be 
legally entitled by way of customary right. Needless to say, as a result of the 
Marlborough Sounds decision, the Crown' s title to the foreshore is by no means secure, 
and as will be discussed, the implications of the case for the Crown, Maori and the New 
Zealand public are, without doubt, substantial. 17 
B The decision by Hingston J 
In April 1997, Te Tau Ihu Iwi (the eight iwi of the northern part of the South Island) 
applied to the Maori Land Court to determine whether they had and continue to have 
customary rights over the foreshore and seabed in and around the Marlborough Sounds in 
New Zealand. 18 The interim decision by Hingston J dealt with the preliminary issue of 
whether since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 any such Maori Customary 
rights might have been already extinguished either by the operation of common law or 
15 
Article two of the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 offers protection to Maori ' lands, estates, forests , and 
fisheries, which they may collectively and individually possess, so long as it is their wish to retain the same 
in their possession '. 
16 "Foreshore appeal disturbs", above n 2 . The article by Alison Tocker discusses legal, political and 
academic reaction to the implications of the Maori Land Court decision . The decision is said to have 
"startled legal , political and academic circles". 
17 
The potential ramifications of the case are discussed in "Foreshore appeal disturbs", above n 2, 9. 
"Ramifications could cover coastal structures and coastal users throughout New Zealand, including ports, 
marine farmers , fish catchers and wharf owners. The decision could see coastal users having to pay rent to 
the Maoris ruled to be owners." 
18 
The application by Te Tau Ihu lwi was precipitated by the Crown ' s declared intention to invoke the 
coastal tendering provisions of the Resource Management Act 1991 in the Marlborough Sounds. The 
tendering of coastal space was arguably in direct conflict with the customary ownership rights of Te Tau 
lhu lwi . 
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legislation. For the purposes of this decision it was assumed that there were Maori 
customary rights prior to 1840 both over the foreshore and the seabed. 
In respect of the foreshore, the Crown argued that the Court of Appeal decision in Jn re 
the Ninety Mile Beach ruled out the Maori claim. The applicants argued that the decision 
could be restricted to its facts, was flawed, or had been overruled. Hingston J stated that 
Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach case would decide the question at hand and should the case 
apply he would be bound by that decision. 
C Hingston J's analysis of In re the Ninety Mile Beach 
Hingston J found that in Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach it was determined that: 
(a) The mere assumption of sovereignty by the Crown over the country did not 
thereby deprive the Maori Land Court of jurisdiction to investigate title to land 
below high water mark. 
(b) Once an application for the investigation of title to land having the sea as its 
boundary was determined by the Maori Land Court, the customary title right of 
the Maori was wholly extinguished to low water mark and replaced by Maori 
ownership or forfeited to the Crown- depending on where the boundary was fixed. 
( c) Section 14 7 Harbours Act ( and its successor 150 Harbours Act 1950), in providing 
that the foreshore around New Zealand could only be disposed of by a special Act 
of Parliament, unless there had been express authority to the contrary, effectively 
deprived the Maori Land Court of jurisdiction to investigate customary rights in 
the foreshore. 
In light of this analysis, Hingston J concluded he was not bound by Jn re the Ninety Mile 
Beach "because it applies only where the Maori Land Court had investigated the 
adjoining lands above high water mark prior to any disposition of the land" 1
9
. He felt In 
re the Ninety Mile beach should be limited to this essential finding, and the ratio should 
not be extended to encompass lands purchased before the Land court came into being. 20 
Hingston J's reasoning to not extend Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach were based on his 
feeling that the case was decided on insufficient grounds21 which should not now extend 
to determine this matter which "has such important consequences for Maori". Hingston J 
criticised the "difficulty in ascertaining the rationale behind the learned Judge" and noted 
that the "North J proposition had not been tested by the Privy Council, and the current 
New Zealand Court of Appeal could well have differing views even if the result for the 
19 h Jn re t e Marlborough Sounds and Seabed above, n I, 5. 
20 This includes most of the South Island which has not been the subject of an investigation. Purchases 
made by Commissioner Donald McLean 1853-56 and the Kemp purchase of 1848 account for the sale of 
the majority of the South Island from Ngati Toa and Ngati Tahu. 
21North J's explanation in Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach,above n 12, for his finding that the Maori Land 
Court did not have jurisdiction to investigate the foreshore was that a finding against the Crown would 
"have a startling and inconvenient result". This is the reasoning Hingston J is referring to as "insufficient". 
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Crown was inconvenient". He drew attention to the direction Treaty jurisprudence has 
taken in the last decade towards regarding the interests of the Maori and clarified that the 
Court is now enjoined by statute to promote the retention of Maori land in the hands of 
Maori. 22 With these guidelines, Hingston J believed following Jn re the Ninety Mile 
Beach would be seen to be acting "contrary to both this statutory directive and Treaty 
principles". Hingston J suggested Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach "should be revisited by 
h. h h . " 23 1g er aut onty . . 
The decision is a preliminary determination. Leave to appeal to the Maori Appellate 
Court was given by Judge Hingston.24 The case was presented to the Maori Appellate 
Court on 11 May 1998. At present, the case is still with the Maori Appellate Court which 
is dealing with the preliminary question of whether or not the case will be referred to the 
High Court or be considered by the Maori Appellate Court itself. 
25 
V EFFECTS OF THE MARLBOROUGH SOUNDS DECISION 
Should Marlborough Sounds survive appeal, the Maori Land Court will not only be in the 
position to investigate claims to those parts of the foreshore which have not been subject 
to prior investigation, but be will empowered to issue freehold titles where evidence of 
customary rights can be establis d. The case not only raises the question of who in fact 
is the legal 'owner' of the foreshore, but it is suggested the decision has significant 
implications for the legal assumption upon which the government, regional councils and 
the general public rely, that assumption being that the foreshore is public property for the 
use and enjoyment of all.26 Thus, the decision will send vibrations throughout New 
Zealand and touch directly upon the Crown, Maori and the general public of New 
Zealand. 
22 Te Ture Whenua Maori Land Act I 993, Preamble and s I 7. Both refer to the desire to "promote and 
assist in the retention of Maori Land and General Land owned by the Maori in the hands of its owners." 
23 Jn re the Marlborough Foreshore and Seabed, above n 13,5. 
24 The Crown and six other bodies have appealed to the Maori Appellate Court against Judge Hingston ' s 
decision : the Port of Marlborough New Zealand, the Marlborough District Council, Te Ati Awa 
Manawhenua kite Tau lhu Trust, Te Runanga o Muriwhenua, the New Zealand Aquaculture Council and 
the New Zealand Marine Farming Association. 
25 
The Crown indicated a preference for a case to be stated to the High Court or the Court of Appeal. They 
argued the matter in issue is 'general law ' and thus outside the specialist jurisdiction of the Maori Appellate 
Court. According to "Foreshore appeal disturbs ", above n 2, 9, "there has been much debate over the 
decision by Doug Graham (the previous Attorney-General) to take the decision to the Maori Appellate 
Court". It has raised questions about whether a specialist Maori body can make impartial decisions and, by 
extension, about the ability of the High Court and Court of Appeal, (seen by some Maoris as ' Eurocentric ' ), 
to make unbiased decisions. Furthermore, the article cites Dr Williams (Treaty of Waitangi Law researcher 
and acting associate professor at Auckland University Law School) who " is surprised the Crown did not 
seek Judicial Review of Judge Hingston ' s decision in the High Court." Dr Williams also noted that 
"because the Maori Appellate Court is made up of 3 or more Maori Land Court judges it is likely that all 
will be achieved is another opinion from a group of Maori Land Court judges. My suspicion is it won ' t 
resolve the issue" . 
26 The Foreshore, above n 4,4. 
7 
A Implications for the Maori Land Court 
The most obvious consequence of Hingston J's judgement is the potential change to the 
jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court. Subject to the possibility of an appeal of the 
preliminary decision, the Marlborough Sounds case will widen the jurisdiction of the 
Maori Land Court. Where North and Gresson J27 stripped the Maori Land court of 
jurisdiction to investigate title to the foreshore, the Marlborough Sounds decision restores 
the Land Court with jurisdiction to investigate title to those parts of the foreshore which 
have not previously been the subject of an investigation. 
Although Marlborough Sounds does not override the Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach 
decision, Hingston J distinguished the case on its facts and took the opportunity to 
criticise the judgement. This effectively has meant Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach will most 
probably be revisited and possibly overturned. Hingston J's decision effectively side 
steps the Court of Appeal decision by pointing out that the ratio decidendi is limited to 
areas where the Land Court had undertaken an investigation of customary title prior to 
the time any land was purchased. Hence, the Marlborough Sounds case could open up 
parts of the foreshore to investigation which the Maori Land Court has previously been 
barred from undertaking and gives rise to the possibility that areas will be returned to 
Maori ownership. Where the Crown, or its agents, purchased direct from Maori before 
the Land Court came into existence in 186228, an investigation to determine Maori 
interests may now be possible and such areas could be returned to Maori. It has been 
suggested "that it can be plausibly argued that the entire foreshore at the present time is 
still Maori customary land".29 
B Implications on the existing law relating to ownership of the foreshore: In re 
the Ninety Mile Beach 
Should Marlborough Sounds survive appeal, the decision will change the existing law 
relating to ownership of the foreshore contained in Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach. This in 
itself is of great concern for the Crown whose legal title to the foreshore rests upon the 
reasoning in Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach. For this reason, it is essential to ascertain the 
likelihood of Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach remaining a binding precedent and the source 
of the Crown's title to the foreshore. 
(a) criticisms of the Court of Appeal judgement 
The Maori Land Court decision in Marlborough Sounds does not override Jn re the 
Ninety Mile Beach, yet the harsh criticisms of the 1963 judgement made by Hingston J 
27 Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach,above n 12,416. 
28 The Native Land Court was established under the Native Land Act 1862. 
29 The Foreshore. above, n 4, 27. As well as most of the South Island, coastal areas around the old New 
Zealand company settlements at New Plymouth, Wanganui, Wellington, and parts of North land and 
Auckland may be affected. 
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have sent poisoned arrows to the heart of the Court of Appeal decision and have cast 
serious doubt over the sustainability of In re Ninety Mile Beach as a binding precedent. 
But are Hingston J's criticisms warranted? To decide this it is valuable to analyse the 
Court of Appeal decision in order to conclude the likelihood of In re the Ninety Mile 
Beach remaining valid law. 
C Critical Analysis of In re the Ninety Mile Beach Case- will it remain a binding 
precedent? 
(a) the rationale of the Court of Appeal 
(i) the prima facie ownership of the foreshore argument 
The Court of Appeal is well supported in contending that the Crown cannot claim to 
'own' the foreshore by mere operation of the common law in New Zealand. The common 
law gives the Crown a prima facie territorial right to the foreshore. In Nireaha v Baker30 
the Privy council considered s 2 Land Claims Ordinance Act 1841 and found that that 
provision did not confer title to New Zealand lands on the Crown, but made the Crown's 
rights subject to "the rightful and necessary occupation of the aboriginal inhabitants" and 
to an extent was a "legislative recognition of the rights confirmed and guaranteed by the 
Treaty of Waitangi". Furthermore, as far back as 1870, the Maori Land Court in 
Kauwaerenga held the Crown's argument, that the Land Court had no jurisdiction to 
investigate title to the foreshore based on the Crown's prima facie title, to be wrong. 31 
Accordingly, Hingston J supported the Court of Appeal's conclusion. The Court of 
Appeal is unlikely to be overruled on this point. 
However, it is the remaining reasoning of the Court of Appeal which Hingston J 
criticised and which arguably would not stand up to serious scrutiny. 
(ii) the statutory argument 
The Court of Appeal held that section 14 7 Harbours Act 187832 operates as an effective 
restriction upon the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court to investigate and grant title to 
land below high water mark. The Court of Appeal's statutory basis for denying the land 
Court jurisdiction 'is unlikely to be accepted by a modem Court. ' 33 Firstly, the Harbours 
Act has been repealed by section 362 Resource Management Act 1991 without a 
replacement provision.34 Furthermore, the Crown in the proceedings of the Marlborough 
Sounds openly admitted, that since the recent appeal of section 150 Harbours Act 1950, 
30 Nireaha Tamaki v Baker [1901] NZPCC 371 
31 
Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach case.above n 3, per North J, cited in Marlborough Sounds, above n, 3. 
32 
Now s 150 Harbours Act 1950. 
33 The Foreshore, above n 4, 69. 
34 
Jn re the Marlborough Sounds, above n 13,4. Hingston J saw this subsequent repeal as "effectively taking 
away that prohibition against the Court entering into an inquiry as to whether customary rights still exist". 
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the jurisdiction to determine title has been restored to the Land Court.35 However, it has 
been suggested36 that although section 150 Harbours Act 1950 has been repealed by the 
Resource Management Act 1991, section 354 of that Act provides that any rights to land 
which accrued prior to the repeal are retained.37 
This Acts Interpretation Act 1924 section 20(e) and (f) further supports this: "the repeal 
of any Act shall not affect existing statutes and not revive anything not in force at the 
time of the repeal". It was the Crown's submission in the Marlborough Sounds litigation 
that it is 'therefore clear that customary title to any foreshore would not be revived by the 
repeal of this Act, as it is clear that customary title, once extinguished cannot be 
revived' .38 However, this argument loses its simplicity when one examines the Harbours 
Act 1950 in detail and finds that it is not a vesting act. There is no provision in the Act 
which explicitly vests ownership of the foreshore in the Crown, thus section 354 arguably 
does not refer to section 150 Harbours Act 1950. 
However, whether section 150 exists or not, it is in any case doubtful whether the 
Harbours Act 1950 could meet the current stringent standards relating to valid statutory 
extinguishments of Aboriginal title. The High Court of Australia has held that for 
extinguishment of aboriginal title by executive or legislative action, there must be a ' clear 
and plain intention to do so' 39. This has been followed by the New Zealand Courts in 
Faulkner v Tauranga District Council. 40Wherein, Blanchard J stated: 
"Customary title can only be extinguished by the Crown by means of a deliberate 
Act authorised by law and unambiguously directed towards that end . .. customary title 
does not disappear by a side wind." 
Section 150 is only a restriction on the prerogative rights of the Crown and does not on 
the face of it meet the Faulkner test. It provides that ' no part of the shore of the sea' 
35 "In re Marlborough Sounds foreshore and seabed." Maori Law Review, December 1997 /January 1998, 
Editor: Tom Bennion, Published by Esoteric Publications, Wellington, New Zealand. 
36 Submissions of the Crown, above n 5, 24. 
37 Section 354 Resource Management Act 1991 provides:"354. Crown' s existing rights to resources to 
continue-
(!) Without limiting the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 but subject to subsection (2), it is hereby declared 
that the repeal by this Act or the Crown Minerals Act 1991 of any enactment, including in particular-
(a) Section 3 of the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 ; and 
(b) Section 21 of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967; and 
(c) Section 261 of the Coal Mines Act 1979,-
Shall not affect any right, interest, or title, to any land or water acquired, accrued,, established by, or vested 
in , the Crown before the date on which this Act came into force, and every such right, interest, and title 
shall continue after that date as if those enactments had not been repealed. 
38 Authority for this proposition is sought from Mabo v Queensland (No 2)[1992] 175 CLR I ["Mabo (no 
2) "] where Brennan J held at page 29: "A Crown grant which vests in the grantee an interest in land which 
is inconsistent with the continued right to enjoy a native title in respect of the same land necessarily 
extinguishes the native title .. . if a lease be granted, the lessee acquires the reversion expectant on the 
expiry of the term. The Crown ' s title is thus expanded from the mere radical title and, on the expiry of the 
term, becomes a plenum dominium." 
39 Mabo (no 2),above n 38, 64 per Brennan J 
4° Faulkner v Tauranga District Council [1996] I NZLR 357, 363 . ["Faulkner "] 
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could be conveyed or granted in any way to any body or person 'without the special 
sanction of an Act of the General Assembly'. Furthermore the Parliamentary debates do 
not illustrate that the provision was intended to cancel Maori claims to the foreshore. This 
matter was not debated at all. 41 Whatever Parliament's intentions were, the Harbours Act 
1878 and its successors failed to clarify the Land Court's jurisdiction over the foreshore. 
By invoking the Harbours Act, the Court of Appeal effectively extinguished Native title 
to the foreshore by a 'side wind'. Although this may be easy to contend in the wisdom of 
hindsight, the Court of Appeal possibly knew the vagueness of the provision but thought 
it did not matter. North J himself stated: 
"It might be said that it is a little curious that so sweeping a provision is to be 
found in the Harbours Act."42 
However, the learned Judge left it at that. 
Furthermore, it has also been suggested that s 150 Harbours Act 1950 does not possess 
the confiscatory effect the judges in In re the Ninety Mile Beach attributed to it. Although 
the Act did not allow the Crown to grant an area of foreshore, this arguably "did not 
prevent the Maori Land Court from conducting the preliminary steps to a grant, that is to 
say an investigation of title in the Court and the issuing of a title from the Court."43 
It appears the weight the judges placed on the Harbours Act 1950 was too heavy and that 
under scrutiny the Act would not amount to a "plain intention" to extinguish customary 
title. Hence the Court of Appeal's reasoning to bar jurisdiction appears to deserve the 
criticism Hingston J afforded it. 
(iii) the Maori Land Court argument 
The Court of Appeal's further reasoning was based on the consequences of an 
investigation of title to adjoining coastal blocks. The judges decided that the process of 
investigation of title by the Native Land Court cancelled Maori title to the foreshore in all 
instances where foreshore areas adjacent to coastal blocks were not specifically included 
in the certificate of title and the Crown grant. As Hingston J suggests, it is argued the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeal is "insufficient". 
The suggestion advanced by the Court of Appeal is arguably wrong. It seems wholly 
illogical to purport that the process of investigation of title to a coastal block operates in 
this manner. If the area of foreshore is left out of the title, the most natural conclusion is 
41 1869 Vo! VI NZPD 196 Thames Beach Bill, Mr Fox. 
42 Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach, above n 12, 474, per North J. North J pointed out that the submission in the 
case that the words of exception in s 150 namely 'except as may already have been authorised by or 'under 
any Act or ordinance' have the effect of preserving the original jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court, had 
'some force'. 
43 Richard Boast "In re the Ninety Mile Beach Revisited: The Native Land Court and the Foreshore in New 
Zealand Legal History" (1993) 23 VUWLR, 153. [ "Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach Revisited"] This argument 
regards the Land Court title as 'a special sanction of an Act of the General Assembly", namely the Native 
Lands Act 1862. 
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not that the land remains in the Crown, but that it was uninvestigated and remains 
customary land. 44 The Court of Appeal is in some way suggesting that the Crown 
somehow 'owned' the foreshore to begin with and in doing so is basing their analysis on 
a view at "variance with contemporary understanding".45 It is highly unlikely a modem 
Court would agree with this approach, as it would amount to an extinguishment of Native 
title by a side wind. 
Furthermore the Court arrived at this strong assertion by virtue of a set of false 
assumptions. The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that the Native Land Court in 
'all probabilities' must have investigated all of the land in New Zealand adjoining the 
beach (and perhaps all land in New Zealand). North J said: 
"I find it quite impossible to accept the proposition that there is still a block of 
land lying between high water mark and low water mark which has never been 
investigated." 46 
However, this is not correct. The Court failed to consider the legal history of the Ninety 
Mile Beach. The Court of Appeal judges could not even have seen the transcript of the 
proceedings in In re the Ninety Mile Beach in the Maori Land Court47 , which include a 
reasonably detailed statement of evidence on the legal history of the coastal area given by 
an officer of the Department of Lands and Survey.48 Thus the Court of Appeal judges 
"should have known"49 that the land had passed to the Crown (thereby extinguishing 
Native Title) by means of pre-emption deeds of cession. These were: 
(i) The Muriwhenua South deed of 3 February 1858 
(ii) The Ahipara deed of 13 December 1859 
These deeds accounted for a substantial amount of Ninety Mile Beach frontage. 
Although neither purchase explicitly vests any of the foreshore in the Crown, the Crown 
Land Purchase Commissioners arguably acted on the assumption that a pre-emption era 
deed extinguished Maori title over the foreshore. so Additionally a purchase was followed 
by a proclamation in the Gazette describing the area over which the Native title has been 
extinguished. It is beyond doubt that a Maori could legally sell the foreshore to the 
Crown and the Crown could legally purchase it. Furthermore it is likely that the deed may 
44 The Foreshore, above, n 4, 69. 
45 The Foreshore. above, n 4, 70. 
46 Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach, above n 12, 473, per North J. 
47 In re the Ninety Mile Beach (1957) 85 Northern MB 126, per Morison J. 
48 According to affidavits provided by the Lands Survey office Ninety Mile Beach had been alienated by 
pre-emption deeds of cession which extinguished Native title well before the establishment of the Native 
Land Court in 1862. 
49 
Interview with Richard P Boast, 22 May 1998.[ "Interview"] 
50 
Select Committee on the Thames Sea Beach Bill I 869 AJHR F-7, 6 . James Mackay 1869 said to the 
Select Committee: "the general custom of the Native Lands Purchase Department, respecting lands 
between high and low water mark, has been to consider that when Native title is extinguished over the main 
land, then any rights the Natives have over tidal lands have ceased." 
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well meet the "deliberate Act authorised by law and unambiguously directed towards that 
end" test in Faulkner. This appears to be the most natural and sensible way of regarding 
foreshore acquisition rather than the convoluted analysis of the Court of Appeal, and 
would alleviate the Crown's concern as to the lack of statutory extinguishment of native 
title. 51 The Court of Appeal decision is somewhat flawed in failing to give attention to 
the outcome of title to the foreshore where coastal lands were sold to the Crown by pre 
1862 deed of cession. This has been considered a "negligent remiss" by the Court of 
Appeal. 52 Hingston J's criticisms of the Court's analysis of the investigation process of 
the Maori Land Court appears valid. 
(iv) the rationale in light of modern legal developments 
Furthermore, it would seem that the rationale devised by the Court of Appeal is contrary 
to modem legal developments and attitudes towards Maori rights, which in themselves 
throw a dark shadow over the value of In re the Ninety Mile Beach as a binding 
precedent. 
Arguably, the reasoning in In re the Ninety Mile Beach infringes upon the rights of Maori 
under the Treaty of Waitangi. Article two of the Treaty offers protection to Maori "lands 
and estates, forests and fisheries, which they may collectively or individually possess, so 
long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession." Denying the 
Maori Land Court jurisdiction to investigate claims to the foreshore effectively strips the 
Crown's obligation to recognise the wishes of Maori, namely to possess the foreshore. 53 
Furthermore In re the Ninety Mile Beach is arguably inconsistent with the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi. Since the Court of Appeal decision in 1963, New Zealand has 
seen a resurgence of the importance of the Treaty of Waitangi in both legislation54 and 
case law. 55 The New Zealand Maori Council case in 1987 brought life to the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi and acknowledged the partnership between the Crown and Maori. 
Within this partnership the Crown has a duty to provide "active protection" of Maori 
people in the use of their lands to the fullest extent possible. 56 According to Richardson J 
in the same case, this includes a duty on the Crown to make informed decisions with 
regard to Maori taonga. Arguably the Court of Appeal's failure to inform itself of the 
51 The Foreshore, above n 4, 70. 
52 Interview, above n 49. 
53 PG Hugh "The legal basis for Maori claims against the Crown" (I 988) VUWLR I 8, 5 ["The legal basis 
for Maori claims"] views Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach as effectively "offending the land guarantee of the 
Treaty of Waitangi" and "preventing a class of British subjects commencing litigation in Her Majesty's 
courts to obtain the legal protection of their property and rights." 
54 For example, the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi have been included in the following Acts: Treaty 
of Waitangi Act I 985, Te Ture Whenua Maori land Act 1993, Resource Management Act 1991, 
Conservation Act I 987, State-owned Enterprises Act I 986. Those empowered to make decisions under 
these Acts must take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi when exercising their discretion. 
55 See for example The New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1987] I NZLR 641 (CA). This 
case is known as a landmark case wherein Cooke P and Richardson J brought back life to the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi. 
56 
The New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General, above n 55, per Cooke P. 
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legal history of Ninety Mile Beach and its consequent decision based on a factual 
mistake, amounts to a breach of the Treaty principles. 
Furthermore the enactment of Te Ture Whenua Maori Land Act 1993 arguably casts 
doubt over the value of In re the Ninety Mile Beach. To follow the case and continue to 
deny the Maori Land Court jurisdiction would encroach upon the objectives of the Act, 
being to promote and assist in: 
(i) the retention of Maori Land and General Land owned by the Maori in the hands 
of its owners, and 
(ii) the effective use, management and development by or on behalf of the owners, of 
Maori Land and General land owned by the Maori. 57 
(v) summary of the analysis of In re the Ninety Mile Beach 
The above analysis of the rationale of the Court of Appeal appears to be "insufficient" as 
Hingston J suggests, and unlikely to succeed close scrutiny by the courts of today. 58 By 
implication, Hingston J's harsh criticisms of In re the Ninety Mile Beach in Marlborough 
Sounds are warranted and have exposed the weakness of the Court of Appeal decision. 
Even if In re the Ninety Mile Beach does survive an appeal, Marlborough Sounds has 
proved In re the Ninety Mile Beach can be distinguished on facts. 
VI IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIKELY OVERRULING OF IN RE THE NINETY 
MILE BEACH 
Hingston J' s criticisms of In re Ninety Mile Beach have cast a blinding spotlight on the 
case. Hingston J has effectively forced the judgement into possible scrutiny and has 
potentially brought about the high possibility of it being overturned. Should Marlborough 
Sounds survive appeal and In re the Ninety Mile Beach be overturned, the consequences 
for the Crown are significant. 
A Implications on the Crown's title to the foreshore 
Currently, the Crown's claim to the foreshore rests within the Court of Appeal decision in 
In re the Ninety Mile Beach. With the possibility of higher authority revisiting In re the 
Ninety Mile Beach and the likelihood that the Court of Appeal decision will be overruled 
in the near future, the Crown will be left with next to nothing to base its title to the 
foreshore upon. This is of concern to the Crown and, as will be demonstrated, to the 
public of New Zealand in general. 
57 Te Ture Whenua Maori Land Act 1993, s 17 (I )(a) & (b). 
58 In "Foreshore appeal disturbs",above, n 2, 9, Alison Tacker notes that Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach has 
been regarded as an example of the bias of the British legal system against various ethnic groups, and 
Maori law commentators suggest with the passing of time the decision will no longer be good. 
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1 Background: The Crown's title to the foreshore 
Up until In re the Ninety Mile Beach in 1963, the Crown based its claim to the foreshore 
upon the common law assumption that the Crown is prima facie the presumptive owner 
of the foreshore by prerogative right. As has been discussed above, 59 the first conception 
of the prima facie title of the Crown to the foreshore was as far back as 1568-9 when Mr 
Thomas Digges wrote his Treatise which set up the claim of the Crown to the foreshore. 
The prima facie title of the Crown to the foreshore has survived throughout the centuries, 
but it is worth noting that the theory has not been free of criticism. In the late nineteenth 
century Stuart A. Moore wrote his "History and Law of the foreshore and Seashore", 60 
wherein he rebuked the theory of the primafacie title of the Crown as: 
"a mere theory of abstract law, a theory of law taken for granted, 
based upon an untrue assumption of a state of facts which might possibly 
have existed, but which is not really in accordance with the true state of 
facts relating to the matter. ..... as it was clearly before the time of Queen 
Elizabeth in England, and down to 1849 in Scotland, that prima facie the 
manors and estates of the subjects extend to the low-water mark and 
include the foreshore. This, of course, is precisely the reverse of the 
presumption which is asked for by the theory which is vouched as 
undoubted law" 
However, such criticism did not carry the strength to dispel the accepted presumption of 
the Crown's title to the foreshore. 61 
The foreshore and the seabed have undoubtedly been regarded by the common law as 
exceptional. The accepted principle at common law is that the Crown is, by grace of 
prerogative right, the presumptive owner of the foreshore, the beds of tidal rivers, the 
seabed, and coastal waters. Such a title can of course be displaced by proof of a title 
adverse to the Crown by means of either a Crown grant or "continuous occupation for a 
sufficient duration for a grant to be presumed or a title by limitation acquired."62 
Effectively, the Crown is "presumed to have been the owner of the foreshore all 
along ... and no record of the Crown's title is necessary."63 In New Zealand the Crown has 
persistently maintained that these common law principles apply in New Zealand as a 
result the transfer of sovereignty by Her Majesty Queen Victoria in 1840 which 
introduced the common law of England as the Law of the Colony until abrogated or 
modified by statute64 . The Crown has argued that it naturally follows that in New Zealand 
59 See discussion under Ill A: Foreshore Ownership: the common law and its application in New Zealand. 
60 History and Law of the Foreshore above n 7. 
61 ."The legal basis for Maori Claim, above n 53, 5. PG McHugh has also criticised the primafacie theory 
as "a crude blend of feudal and Austinian thoughts. 
62 McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, Claredon, Oxford, 1989, 105.[ "Common Law Aboriginal Title"] 
63 
Common Law Aboriginal Title, above n 62. 
64 See for example the English Laws Act 1858, Imperial Laws Act 1988 and other cases such as Cooper v 
Stuart ( 1889) 14 App. Cas. 286, 291. R. v Joyce (1906) 25 NZLR 78, 79,80, 112, Jn re the Bed of 
Wanganui[ 1962] NZLR 600, 624, (cases cited in Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach, above n 12, 76. 
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it is 'beyond dispute that the Crown is prima facie entitled to every part of the foreshore 
between high and low water mark.' 65 In 1881 the Native Minister, Rolleston, exclaimed: 
"The foreshore is reserved for the use of the whole. Without a special vote of 
Parliament the foreshore belongs to the sovereign for the use of both Maori and 
pakeha." 66 
However, over time the Crown has acknowledged the flimsy assumptions upon which the 
prima facie theory is based and has taken various measures to preserve its ownership and 
control of the foreshore. During the 1870's a large number of claims to the foreshore 
were coming before the Court and began causing concern to the government who knew 
that in strict law the Crown's title to the foreshore was weak. The government eventually 
took action to prevent the Land Court from embarking on further investigations to the 
foreshore by issuing a Proclamation67 which suspended the operation of the Native Land 
Court below high water mark. 68 
2 The Crown's title in modern times 
More recently the Crown's position has been said to be "based on a misconception" 69 
and was also criticised by Fenton CJ in the Kauwaeranga judgement of 1870.70 In In re 
the Ninety Mile Beach the prima facie theory was finally repudiated, with North J 
regarding the argument as simplistic: 
"I cannot escape the conclusion that in advancing this argument the Crown is 
endeavouring to assert a pre-existing right.' 71 
Thus, as a result of the 1963 decision, the Crown lost its ability to base a claim to the 
foreshore on this ground. The rationale devised by the Court of Appeal to secure the 
Crown's title to the foreshore now constitutes the legal basis of the Crown's claim. 
3 The Crown's title without In re the Ninety Mile Beach 
In re the Ninety Mile Beach is of great importance to the Crown as it acts to ensure the 
Crown remains 'owner' or 'trustee' of the foreshore. The judgement denies the Maori 
65 Authority found in Attorney General v Emerson [ 189 I] AC 649, at 653, cited in In re the Ninety Mile 
Beach,above, no 2, at 475, per Gresson J. 
66 Richard Boast and D Edmunds, The Treaty of Waitangi and Resource Management Law, in Brooker's 
Resource Management (Brooker's, Wellington). Vol lA, TW 112. 
67 S 4 of the Native Lands Act 1867 allowed the Governor to suspend the operation of the Land Court in 
any districts. 
68 
The Proclamation prevented the Native Land Court from undertaking an investigation almost identical to 
that of the Marlborough Sounds claim, in 1872 in the Thames district. However, the Proclamation was 
rendered ineffective in 1873 when its empowering provision was replaced by the Native Lands Act 1873. 
69 
The Treaty of Waitangi and Resource Management Law, above, n 66, TW 112. 
70 
Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach, above n 12,471 wherein North J summarizes Fenton CJ's opinion in 
Kauwaerenga, above n 10, that the common law presumption of prima facie ownership of the foreshore 
was 'entirely inconsistent with and destructive of all claims of this character." 
71 Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach, Above n 12, 468. 
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Land Court jurisdiction to investigate titles in coastal blocks fronting the sea. This has 
effectively prevented the Court from issuing freehold titles to the foreshore. 72 Until now, 
the Crown has presumed the Court of Appeal decision would prevent all Maori claims to 
the foreshore from coming to the Court and ensure freehold titles would not be issued to 
Maori. However as discussed, the decision is not as confiscatory as the Crown has 
presumed and effectively still allows claims to land fronting the foreshore to be 
considered as long as they have not been subject to an investigation by the Land Court. 
(a) the Crown loses its primary legal claim to the foreshore 
Nevertheless, should Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach be revisited by higher authority and 
subsequently overturned, the Crown will lose yet another means of securing title to the 
foreshore. The Crown cannot argue it is prima facie entitled to the foreshore, nor can the 
Crown contend that the process of investigation of title by the Native Land court 
extinguished Maori customary title to the foreshore. 73 Furthermore, s 150 Harbours Act 
1950 can no longer be said to vest the foreshore in the Crown and it is unlikely any other 
statutes in New Zealand at the present day would amount to a deliberate extinguishment 
of Native title over the foreshore. There does not appear to be any statutory provision 
which explicitly vests ownership of the foreshore in the Crown. Although there are a 
number of statues which refer to the foreshore74 and some which appear to based on an 
assumption that the foreshore belongs to the Crown, 75 a mere assumption is not enough. 
When it comes to statutory extinguishment of customary title, the extinguishment must 
be clear and plain. Arguably none of the current law relating to the foreshore would meet 
the Faulkner test of extinguishment of aboriginal title. 
(b) pre-emptive purchase 
Arguably, the only remaining avenue for the Crown to claim ownership and control of 
the foreshore is via pre-emptive purchases 76. However, onerous and costly surveys to find 
72 The case has effectively left the Crown title to the foreshore free from challenge by Maori claimants. The 
only claims touching on the foreshore have been in relation to fishery rights. For example see Keepa v 
Inspector of Fisheries [1965] NZLR 322 (SC), Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [ 1986] l NZLR 680 
(HC), Green v Ministry of Fisheries [ 1990] 1 NZLR 411 ). 
73 These conclusions are based on the critical analysis of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and the 
criticisms afforded by Hingston J in the Marlborough Sounds case. 
74 The Conservation Act 1987, The Conservation Law Refonn Act 1990, the Foreshore and Seabed 
Endowment Revesting Act 1991, the Resource Management Act 1991 all refer to the foreshore and give 
extensive definitions of the coastal area. 
75 See for example the Resource Management Act 1991, and The foreshore ,above n 4 wherein Richard 
Boast suggests The Foreshore and Seabed Endowment Revesting Act 1991, and, perhaps, the Conservation 
Act 1987 are based on the same assumption. 
76 There is a high possibility that deeds of pre-emptive purchase cover almost the whole area of the 
Marlborough Sounds which is subject to this claim. The Submissions of the Crown , above n 5, 9 gives a 
detailed history of the sale of the Marlborough Sounds taken from Phillipson Northers South Island District 
Report (Rangahaua Whanui Series 1995). The Crown made a number of purchases of the Nelson-
Marlborough Area between 1847 and 1856. Those are: The Wairau Purchase 1847, The Waitohi Purchase 
1847-50, and purchases by Commissioner D McLean 1853-36 (Ngati Toa Deed 1853, Te Atiawa Deed 
1854, Ngati Tama 1855, Te Atiawa Deed 1856, Ngati Kuia Deed 1856, Ngati Koata Deed 1856.) The 
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out the limits of old pre-emptive purchases and an analysis of their provisions would have 
to be undertaken. Each pre-emptive purchase that took place in New Zealand would have 
to be looked at individually in order to establish whether the purchase extinguished 
Native title to the foreshore. Tliis would be made even more difficult as each pre-emptive 
purchase deed is unique in content. Furthermore, it is likely that many deeds would not 
have mentioned anything regarding the foreshore based on the assumption that it was, 
and would remain, Crown land. In short, it would in all accounts be a highly elaborate 
and cumbersome exercise to establish what happened with each part of the foreshore 
around New Zealand. 
(c) is there a need for executive action to secure the Crown's title? 
In any case, Marlborough Sounds has weakened the Crowns already faltering claim to the 
foreshore. Furthermore it has exposed the confusion of the law in New Zealand relating 
to the foreshore and forced Parliament to recognise that "the law governing the foreshore 
in this country remains profoundly unsatisfactory and needs to be considered afresh."77 
There are strong similarities to the uncertain situation concerning the ownership of 
riverbeds. This is another area where the Crown has historically assumed ownership 
rights without fully considering Maori interests. Litigation in the 1950s and 1960s over 
the ownership of the beds78 has failed to lay those issues at rest. The Waitangi Tribunal in 
its 1993 Pouakani Report urged the Crown in the national interest to give urgent attention 
to the question of ownership and use rights in rivers. It seems that similar 'urgent 
attention' is now required for the foreshore and the seabed. 79 
VII IMPLICATIONS OF MARLBOROUGH SOUNDS ON PUBLIC RIGHTS 
A The public right to the foreshore 
At present in New Zealand we enjoy, for the most part, free and uninhibited access to use 
and enjoy our beaches and sea. The public right of access to the foreshore has been 
retained through Crown ownership "with the Crown viewing itself as a ty~e of trustee for 
the general public in respect of the foreshore and public access thereto." 0 Additionally, 
the government, regional councils and most individuals in New Zealand rely on the 
assumption that the foreshore is public property, or to put it into legal terms, that the 
foreshore belongs to the Crown. 81 Parliament has recently recognised the public right of 
Submission of the Crown refers to "Papers and Documents relative to the Purchases effected in the Middle 
Island by Mr Commissioner McLean-documents 7-17 and 21." 
77 In re The Ninety Mile Beach revisited', above 43, 170 
78 See in particular In re the Wanganui River [1962) NZLR, 600,624 
79 It has been suggested by Doug Graham in "Foreshore appeal disturbs", above, n 2, that should 
Parliament or the government dislike the Maori Appellate Court decision, they will "simply change the Jaw, 
as they have in the past". Doug Graham proposes that changing the law is an option, "if the decision is 
unclear, unjust or unacceptable in the national interest". 
80 Richard Boast, "Report on the Queens Chain", Draft, 1996, 22. ["Report on the Queen's Chain"] 
81 The Foreshore, above n 4, 4. 
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access to the foreshore and has selected "maintenance and enhancement of public access 
to and along the coastal marine area" as "a matter of national importance". 82 
It has been suggested Crown ownership is an awkward method of securing the public 
right of access to an important natural resource. 83 However, despite the reality that there 
are major weaknesses in the Crown's supposed territorial claim to the foreshore, Crown 
ownership has over time preserved the right of the public to access and use the foreshore 
at their leisure. 
B Danger to the public right of access to the foreshore 
With the uncertainty surrounding the Crown's title to the foreshore resulting from the 
Marlborough Sounds judgement, 84 it is quite possible that our cherished access to the 
foreshore may not always be guaranteed in the future. 85 Effectively, the Marlborough 
Sounds decision places the current situation of open access to the coastline in serious 
danger and proves we should no longer take these rights for granted. 86 Fenton CJ, in 
Kauwaerenga, acknowledged the unattractiveness of this potential situation over a 
century ago, in 1870. The learned judge saw the potential threat to the public right to the 
foreshore as one of the "evil consequences of judicially declaring the soil of the foreshore 
will be vested in the Natives."87 
The possibility of a privatised coastline is something the present author finds difficult to 
stomach. It is proposed that the majority of New Zealanders would feel the same way, 
and in doing so would firmly oppose any diminution of their rights of access to the 
beaches and sea by alienation of the foreshore to private individuals. Consequently, this 
nationwide concern needs to be recognised and addressed by those who have the required 
authority to avoid such an infringement upon public rights to the foreshore. 88 
82 S 6(d) Resource Management Act 1991. 
83 "Report on the Queen's Chain", Above no 80,p 8. 
84 The uncertainty is due to the possibity that In re the Ninety Mile Beach could be overturned in the near 
future. 
85 "Foreshore appeal disturbs". Above n 2, 9 suggests that "coastal users may have to pay" those Maoris 
ruled to be owners. 
86 It is not unlikely that individual owners of foreshore blocks would seek to prevent a mass of sun seekers, 
beach goers and surfers by fencing off the beach in order to preserve their privacy. Should this occur, one 
of our greatest and dearest natural resources would no longer be accessible to us all. 
87 Kauwaerenga above n 11. 
88 It is suggested that Parliament has not taken the appropriate measures to adequately protect the public 
right to the foreshore and guard against the type of circumstances that may arise as a result of Marlborough 
Sounds. Arguably legislation should have been passed a long time ago in order to secure the Crown's 
territorial claim to the foreshore and ensure it remains a natural resource accessible to all New Zealanders. 
Legislative action would have proved a lot more effective than 'apparently' resolving the issue of the 
Crown's shaky legal title to the foreshore in the Court of Appeal in Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach. 
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C The value New Zealander's attach to their public right of access to use and 
enjoy the foreshore 
The coast is an important part of the identity of New Zealanders. Most New Zealanders 
have grown up and lived by or near the coast and value the ability to freely use the 
foreshore at our leisure. Few New Zealanders would care to find themselves suddenly 
unable to access the beaches and sea that surrounds us. 
D Historical and statutory recognition of the importance of public access to the 
foreshore 
The importance and value of public access to the foreshore is not only evident in the 
hearts of each New Zealander, but is reflected to a large extent in both the history and the 
laws of New Zealand. 
1 Historical recognition 
From the outset of the Colony's history, the government has recognised it was desirable 
policy for land to be kept in Crown ownership in order to provide not only areas for 
landing places and quays, but access to and use of the foreshore. 
Hobson's instructions from Lord John Russell on 9 December 1840 required Hobson to 
"direct the Surveyor General to report .. what particular lands it may be ... desirable 
to reserve for any other purpose of public convenience, utility, health or enjoyement" 
Russell further directed Hobson to not 'permit or suffer such lands to be occupied by any . £ . ,,g9 pnvate person or any pnvate purposes. 
2 Statutory recognition- marginal strips 
The value of public access to the foreshore is reflected in the extensive legislation 
relating to marginal strips, or the "Queen's chain". In 1990 in Parliament, Anderton 
summarized accurately how many New Zealanders feel about the subject of access to the 
foreshore, "the Queen's chain is part of the country's heritage." 0 Richard P Boast 
suggests, the marginal strip is 'the prime means of ensuring public access to the coast. ' 91 
(a) the Land Claims Ordinance Act 1841 
As early as 1841, Parliament introduced the concept of retaining the foreshore in the 
Crown. The Land Claims Ordinance Act 1841 provided that any person entitled to a 
89 Report on the Queen's Chain. Above, n 80, 23 . 
90 1990 NZPD 518. 
91 .Report on the Queen 's chain Above n 80, 3. 
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Crown grant of land, by virtue of proving a purchase of land from Maori prior to 1840, 
had the following lands excluded from their grant: 
"any headland promontory bay or island that may hereafter be required for any 
purpose of defence or for the site of any town or village reserve or for an purpose of 
public utility, nor of any land situate on the sea-shore within one hundred feet of high 
water-mark." 
The Land Claims Ordinance Act 1841 is effectively a recognition of the "Queen's chain" 
and is evidence that it has long been the intention of the legislature that the Crown control 
an area of both dry land and foreshore to enable public access to the sea. 92 
(b) the Land Act 1892 
Following this lead, the Land Act 1892 was enacted which made provision for reserves of 
land along the seashore and banks of rivers, creeks etc in order to retain Crown 
ownership of these areas for the public benefit. Section 110 of the Land Act 1892 
formally introduced the 'marginal strip' whereby: 
"there shall be reserved from sale or any other disposition a strip of land not less 
then sixty-six feet in width along all high-water lines of the sea, and of its bays, inlets, or 
creeks" 93 
This statutory requirement for marginal strips has continued in Land legislation until the 
whole subject became regulated afresh with the Conservation Law Reform Act 1990. 
Thus, it is not only a public assumption that there exists along the coastline a strip of land 
providing access to our foreshore, but a legal requirement. 
(c) the Conservation Act 1987/ The Conservation Law Reform Act 1990 
The special significance attached to the foreshore as a public resource is reflected in the 
Conservation legislation of the last decade. 94 Part IV A of the Act95 forms a 
comprehensive code which provides for the continuation of the marginal strip.96 The 
92 Submissions of the Crown, Above n 5, 21 wherein it was suggested that it would be anomalous, if the 
Crown having reserved a marginal strip for this purpose after the issue of a grant, the foreshore remained as 
unextinguished customary title. 
93 S 110 Lands Act 1892 continues as follows : "and along the margins of all lakes exceeding fifty acres in 
area, and along the banks of all rivers and streams of an average width exceeding thrity-three feet, and, in 
the discretion of the Commissioner, along the bank of any river or stream of less width than thirty- three 
feet." 
94 Section 2 of the Conservation Act 1987 deems the foreshore a ' conservation area' for ' conservation 
purposes' ; that being the "preservation and protection of natural resouces for the purpose of , among others, 
"providing for their appreciation and recreational enjoyment by the public." 
95 
Part VIA was inserted by the Conservation Law Reform Act 1990. 
96 
The provision for marginal strips is as follows : 
24 Marginal Strips reserved - "There shall be deemed to be reserved from sale or any disposition of any 
land by the Crown a strip of land twenty metres wide extending along and abutting the landward margin of-
(a) any foreshore 
• • • 
" 
• 
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purposes of marginal strips include enabling "public access to any adjacent watercourses 
and bodies of water"and providing for "public recreational use of the marginal strip and 
adjacent watercourses or bodies of water"97 . In fact the whole pretence behind marginal 
strips is public access past private lands and onto public lands, including the foreshore . 
Evidence of the importance attached to the existance of marginal strips is reflected in 
section 24G Conservation Law Reform Act 1990.98 This section makes provision for the 
continuation of the mar~inal strip even when the boundary of the sea changes due to 
erosion or aggregation. 9 One of the main objectives of the changes to the law in 1990 
was to ensure, that the strip will move when the water boundary moves so that there will 
always exist an access way to the foreshore no matter what changes to the land occur. 
Furthermore, whilst the Minister of Conservation is empowered to exempt dispositions of 
land abutting rivers and streams under s 24B, 100 the Minister can never exempt the 
foreshore. This provision demonstrates the primary importance Parliament attaches to 
ensuring public access to the foreshore . 
( d) the Reserves Act 1977 
The Reserves Act 1977 is a further statutory recognition of the value of public access to 
the foreshore. The Act implements management plans for the coastal region and one of 
the general purposes of the Act is "ensuring as far as possible, the preservation of access 
for the public to and along the sea coast." 101 Coastal reserves can be created under the 
Reserves Act 1977 to fulfil this aim. 
(e) the Resource Management Act 1991 
The most recent recognition Parliament has given to the importance of providing public 
access to the foreshore is found within the Resource Management Act 1991. Section 6 ( d) 
of that Act states that the "maintenance and enhancement of public access to and along 
the coastal marine area is a matter of national importance". 102 Provisions relating to 
(b) The nonnal level of the bed of any lake not subject to control by artificial means; or 
(c) The bed of any river or any stream (not being a canal under the control of the Electricity Corporation 
of New Zealand Limited used by the Corporation for, or as part of any scheme for, the generation of 
electricity), being a bed that has an average of 3 metres or more. 
97 S 24C(a) and (b) of the Conservation Law Reform Act 1990. 
98 and as amended bys 7 of the Conservation Amendment Act 1996. 
99 It is a fact of life in New Zealand that the shoreline changes shape, especially in today ' s climate of global 
warming which has caused the level of the sea worldwide to rise (seep 4 Dominion newspaper, 13 August 
1998.) 
'
00 
The Minister can exempt land abutting river or streams under s 248 "if satisfied" that the land has little 
or no value in terms of conservation, public access and public recreational use". 
'
0
' s 3(c) Reserves Act 1977. 
102 s 6(d) Resource Management Act 1991. It is significant that Parliament has selected the foreshore as a 
public resource of special national value. 
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access strips and esplanade reserves or strips in the Resource Management Act are the 
means by which Parliament addresses this matter of national importance. 103 
(f) esplanade reserves or strips 
Esplanade reserves or strips are required to be set aside on the subdivision of land as 
follows: 
230. Requirement for esplanade reserves or esplanade strips-
(3) " ..... where any block of land of less than 4 hectares is created when land is 
subdivided, an esplanade reserve 20 metres in width shall be set aside from that 
allotment along the mean high water springs of the sea, and along the bank of any 
river or along the margin of any lake ... " 
The "purposes" of esplanade strips and esplanade reserves are set out in section 229. 
Such reserves have three main purposes, these being the "protection of conservation 
values", "to enable public access to or along any sea" and "to enable public recreational 
use of the esplanade reserve or esplanade and adjacent sea, river, or lake". 104 
(g) access strips 
Under section 237B Access strips can be created on agreement between a "local authority 
and the registered proprietor of any land to acquire an easement over the land". An 
"access strip" is defined under section 2 as: 
"a strip of land created by the registration of an easement in accordance with 
section 237B for the purpose of allowing public access to or along any river, or lake, or 
the coast." 105 
It is important to be aware of the purposes behind the provisions providing public access 
to the foreshore, as it becomes evident that the law relating to marginal strips and 
esplanade reserves was not designed to protect Maori interests specifically, but the 
objective was rather to facilitate the access rights of the public. 
103 The creation of these reserves and strips is a mechanism whereby a council can satisfy public demand 
for access to and recreational use of the foreshore. 
104 These are the same purposes for which marginal strips are created under s24C Conservation Law 
Reform Act 1990. 
105 Both the access strip and the esplanade strip must be created in accordance with the Tenth Schedule-
"Requirements For Instruments Creating Esplanade Strips and Access Strips". The Tenth Schedule 
provides: "where an easement for an access strip or an esplanade strip for access purposes is created, the 
easement or instrument, creating the strip shall specify that any person shall have the right, at any time, to 
pass and repass over and along the land over which the strip has been created, subject to any other 
provisions of the easement or instrument." This requirement is further recognition by the Resource 
Management Act 199Iofthe value of providing unlimited access to the coastline. 
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3 Public and Judicial recognition 
The importance of public rights of access to the foreshore is not only reflected in New 
Zealand legislation, but in both public and judicial opinion. The Queen's chain for 
example has come to play an important role for the New Zealand public and "any attempt 
to modify the law in the direction of what is perceived by the public- rightly or wrongly-
as restricting access rights is greatly resented". 106 Judgements touching on issues relating 
to the foreshore have been willing to acknowledge the value of public rights of access to 
the foreshore. In Bayly v Bay of Islands County107 it was recognised by the Court that 
"the coastal environment is there to be enjoyed and appreciated and that cannot occur 
unless the community is given access to it." Moreover, in 1881, Rolleston, the Native 
Minister, who stated "the foreshore is reserved for the use of the whole", expressed the 
importance of the public right to the foreshore. 108 
4 Summary 
The above statutory provisions and opinions relating to the foreshore are significant in 
that they all formally recognise the importance of public access to the New Zealand 
foreshore. In particular the long history of Crown ownership of the foreshore and 
legislation providing public access to the coast, demonstrates that public enjoyment of the 
coastline has always been a part of our nation's heritage and should not be left to dwindle 
away. 
However, the decision in Marlborough Sounds appears to overlook the value the New 
Zealand public, judiciary and legislature attaches to the use and enjoyment of the 
foreshore. Arguably the foreshore should remain in Crown ownership to ensure the 
continuation of public rights, and it is encouraged that Marlborough Sounds is a step 
away from this end. However it has been suggested that Crown ownership is itself an 
awkward method of retaining public access and simpler methods which are not linked to 
the Crown's property rights could well exist. Other options to retain the availability of the 
foreshore as a natural resource for all New Zealanders include placing the Crown in a 
trustee position whereby the Crown holds the foreshore for the benefit of all, Maori and 
non-Maori alike. This is not a suggestion that should be dismissed as 'self-serving'. It is a 
time honoured justification for the special legal position of the foreshore that the 
ownership of the Crown is for the benefit of the subject. 109 
106 Report on the Queen's Chain, above, n 80, 6. 
107 Bayly v Bay of Islands County A88/8 l (PT) .Brooker 's Resource Management,, above n 66, vol 1, A2 
44. 
108 Brooker 's Resource Management, Above, n 66, vol I A. Rolleston was challenged on the basis of the 
Crown's claim to the foreshore at an important conference of northern chiefs held at Waitangi, whereby he 
responded with the above statement. 
109 The Foreshore above, n 4, p 4 quoting from Lord Westbury in Gann v Free Fishers of Whitstable 
( 1865) 11 HLC 192, 207, cited in Common Law Aboriginal title, above n 62, I 05. 
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VIII IMPLICATIONS OF MARLBOROUGH SOUNDS ON EXISTING LAW 
PERTAINING TO THE FORESHORE 
It is suggested Hingston J in Marlborough Sounds failed to consider the possibility of a 
privitised coastline and the effects this may have on the various statutory enactments 
which relate to the foreshore. Potential privitisation of the foreshore could effectively 
render illogical a great deal of the statutory law which is premised on the assumption that 
the Crown is the owner of the foreshore. Not only will provisions in various enactments 
providing public access to the foreshore become redundant, but other Acts relating to the 
foreshore will possibly be greatly effected. Section 12 of the Resource Management Act 
1991, which relates to occupation of coastal space, will be analysed in order to provide a 
case study of the type of consequences the Maori Land Court decision could have on 
existing law. 
A Implications on provisions providing access to the foreshore 
The Resource Management Act 1991, the Conservation Act 1987, the Conservation Law 
Reform Act 1990, and the Reserves Act 1977 appear to be premised on the assumption 
that the foreshore is somehow 'owned' by the Crown.110 Understanding that the main 
purpose of laws relating to marginal and access strips, and esplanade reserves is 
providing public access past private lands onto public lands, it is difficult to ignore that 
they become illogical should the foreshore be deemed private land. 
What is the point of having elaborate laws providing access to the foreshore if the 
foreshore is privately owned and not even open to the enjoyment and use of the public? 
Furthermore, if Parliament did not consider the foreshore to be public property and 
available to the general public, why would Parliament have spent such a great deal of 
energy enacting laws which provide access to the foreshore? 
B Implications on other laws pertaining to the foreshore 
The significance of the Marlborough Sounds decision, if correct, is that where there is 
found to be unextinguished customary title, the status of the coastal region will change 
into individual freehold titles. This could effectively render existing laws that relate to the 
foreshore illogical. In order to demonstrate the type of effects this transfer of ownership 
could have upon such laws relating to the foreshore, the coastal permit provisions under 
section 12 of the Resource Management Act 1991 is analysed. 
110 Although none of these Acts explicitly vest the foreshore in the Crown, the proposition advanced by the 
present author (that the Acts are premised on an assumption that the Crown is the owner of the foreshore), 
is devised from a belief that Parliament would not waste their time enacting elaborate laws providing 
access to the coast, if the coast was private property and not available to the public in the first place. 
.. .. 
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1 Section 12- Restriction on the use of the coastal marine area.111 
Unextinguished customary title could fundamentally affect the coastal permit provisions 
of the Resource Management Act 1991 in their present form, and raise issues as to 
whether the structure of the Act will be able to accommodate the recognition of 
customary title, and if so, how. The allocation of coastal permits under the Resource 
Management Act might be affected as at present the provisions under the Act as they 
relate to occupation of coastal space, are based on a presumption (but not a declaration) 
of Crown ownership. If proved that Maori Customary title to the foreshore has not been 
extinguished, then this presumption is incorrect. Moreover, section 12 may no longer be 
applicable to areas of the foreshore where customary title is found to exist. 
Section 12(1) provides for the carrying out of certain activities on the foreshore or 
seabed. Significantly this subsection applies to "any foreshore or seabed". Section 12(2) 
provides for the occupation of coastal space 112. Unless there is an express rule in a 
regional coastal plan or proposed plan allowing occupation, an application must be made 
to the consent authority for a coastal permit to "occupy" space in the coastal marine 
area. 113 The effect of these sections is that compliance with the provisions of the Act is, in 
itself, sufficient to acquire rights to both carry out the activity and to occupy the coastal 
space concemed. 114 Unlike occupation rights issued to land, there is no additional need 
for private negotiations outside of the Act. 115 
111 The following arguments relating to s 12 and the problems therein as a result of the Marlborough 
Sounds case are based on an article by Fiona McLeod, "Maori Customary title to the foreshore and seabed 
and the allocation of coastal permits under the Act", Resource Management Bulletin, 2 (9) Feb 1998: 101-
103 . 
112 Section 354(3) is also relevant which provides: "Any person may use or occupy any land and any related 
part of the coastal marine area in which the Crown has a right, interest, or title without obtaining the 
consent of the Crown under the Land Act 1948 [or the Foreshore and Seabed Endowment Revesting Act 
1991], if the use or occupation by that person does not contravene this Act or regulations". 
11 3 "occupy" carries an extensive definition ins 12(4) Resource Management Act 1991. S 12(4) provides 
(a) "occupy" means occupy the land and any related part of the coastal marine area necessary for the 
activity, -(i) to the exclusion of other persons who do not have a right of occupation to the space by a 
resource consent or under a rule in a regional coastal plan; and (ii) For a period of time and in a way that, 
but for the rule in the regional coastal plan or the holding of a resource consent under this Act, a lease or 
licence to occupy that part of the coastal marine area would be necessary;- and "occupation" has a 
corresponding meaning. 
114 Notwithstanding s 122 RMA ("Consents not real or personal property"), this right is in the nature of a 
lease or a license. It is not necessary to gain the further consent of the Crown (presumably the land owner) 
for the use of the consent. 
115 
The procedure involved in obtaining occupation rights to coastal space can be compared against the 
provisions of the Act relating to land. To carry out a restricted activity on land, an application under s 88 to 
the consent authority for a resource consent must be made. The consent authority then decides under ss I 05 
and 106 whether to grant or decline consent after considering the effect of the activity on the environment. 
The resource consent does not confer upon the consent holder access or occupation rights to the land. 
Unlike consents given in the coastal marine area, it only establishes that the proposed activity is consistent 
with the sustainable management of the land. The consent authority can grant a resource consent 
irrespective of ownership as the right to undertake the activity is not dependent on a right to occupy the 
land. 
.. .. 
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It is the premise of Crown ownership that enables the consent authority to grant rights of 
this scope. Crown ownership is evident in section 12(2). Unlike section 12(1), section 
12(2) applies only to "land of the Crown" or "land vested in the regional council" . 
Hence, if Marlborough Sounds is correct and, after hearing the evidence, the Maori land 
Court declares that an area of the foreshore is Maori customary land for which a freehold 
title should be issued, this area could be outside the perimeters of section 12(2). The land 
would no longer be land of the Crown nor land vested in a regional council. This could 
mean the consent authority would lose its jurisdiction to allocate rights of exclusive 
occupation to any third party. 
Section 12(2) could effectively be rendered useless. The Crown would no longer be in a 
position to authorise the grant of exclusive occupation to a third party where customary 
title is found to exist, and as has been suggested above, this could theoretically involve 
the entire foreshore of New Zealand. Even if it is considered that the subject area is land 
of the Crown by virtue of the common law doctrine that aboriginal title is a burden on the 
Crown's radical title, the Crown would still lose its position as sole issuer of exclusive 
occupation rights. The foreshore would still be land of the Crown within the meaning of 
section 12(2), but subject to customary title and the consent holder could well require the 
additional permission of the customary owner before the consent could be exercised. 116 
With the prospect of s 12(2) becoming obsolete, the provisions relating to coastal permits 
may well have to be amended. A scheme akin to that relating to land could be substituted, 
whereby the right to carry out a particular activity could be obtained by the consent 
authority and the right to occupy the coastal s~ace in question could only be obtained 
through negotiation with the customary owner. 1 7 
2 Further implications of Marlborough Sounds on the Resource Management 
Act 1991 
Should Maori customary title to the foreshore be found to exist in the future as a result of 
Marlborough Sounds, the title will effect the operation of the Resource Management Act 
1991. Customary title would become relevant under Part II of the Act and decisions to 
allocate coastal permits by the consent authority will be weighted with additional 
considerations. 
Part II sets out the principles and purposes of the Resource Management Act. Customary 
ownership is an important aspect of "cultural well being" and is relevant to the purpose of 
promoting the "sustainable management of natural and physical resources" under section 
116 This is the case with land on terra firrna, where the beneficial title is vested in someone other than the 
Crown. 
117 An alternative to this could be placing the Crown in a trustee or fiduciary position when administering 
the foreshore and seabed .. This has been adopted in Canada with respect to Native Reserves, see R v Guerin 
[1984] 2 SCR 335 This title could arguably be accommodated within the existing framework of the RMA. 
It may, for example, be possible to place the consent authority in the Crown's shoes as a fiduciary when s 
12(2) is exercised. 
I 
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5. Where the relationship between Maori and their ancestral lands and waters amounts to 
customary ownership, this is a matter of national importance under section 6 ( e) and must 
be recognised and provided for by "all persons exercising functions and powers" under 
the Act. Additionally, s 8 requires decision makers under the Act to take into account the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi which in themselves affirm the customary title right 
of Maori. 11 8 Thus, with the possible recognition of customary title to the foreshore, Part II 
affirms that customary ownership would become important matter to be considered and 
accorded due weight in the final balancing exercise by the consent authority when 
deciding to grant coastal permits. If a grant of an occupation right under s 12(2) would, in 
effect, negate the continued exercise of customary rights, the consent authority may be 
forced to decline consent. 
3 Summary 
It would appear the decision in the Maori Land Court has not attempted to consider the 
extent to which the Crown' s presumptive title to the foreshore is reflected in legislation. 
Furthermore, the possible effects on statutory provisions relating to the foreshore as a 
result of changing the status of the foreshore form Crown land to private land appear to 
have been ignored by Hingston J. Such disruptive consequences 119should arguably not 
have been disregarded, especially when the result for Parliament could involve the need 
to make time consuming amendments to existing legislation.120 
IX IMPLICATIONS OF MARLBOROUGH SOUNDS FOR MAORI 
Having spent a great deal of time focusing on the negative consequences of Hingston J' s 
interim decision in Marlborough Sounds for the Crown and the public, it would be unfair 
not to draw attention to the positive implications for Maori in particular. The decision 
raises the possibility that the foreshore of New Zealand may be subject to unextinguished 
Maori customary title and the added possibility that the Maori Land court will be restored 
with jurisdiction to investigate and recognise customary title to the foreshore. The 
implications of this for Maori are extensive and predominately positive. 
A The return of ancestral lands 
Where claims to the foreshore have previously been considered "novel" and "far-
reaching"121 by the Courts of New Zealand, Marlborough Sounds has proved such claims 
are now taken seriously. This means there is an increased possibility that Maori ancestral 
lands situated on the foreshore will be returned to respective Iwi. This will not only 
restore mana to Iwi, and the spiritual and physical relationship Maori have with their 
118 Te Runanganui o Te Jka lncorporatedv Attorney General [1994] 2 NZLR 20, 24. 
11 9 
These consequences are demonstrated by the discussion ons 12 Resource Management Act 1991. 
120 
Arguably Hingston J was not required to consider these issues as the decision was an interim 
determination to ascertain whether since the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 Maori customary rights to the 
foreshore and seabed in and around the Marlborough Sounds in New Zealand have been extinguished. 
121 Jn re the Ninety Mile Beach.above, no 12, 466, per North J. 
.. 
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ancestral lands, but will help secure the exercise of kaitiakitanga122 by Iwi and access to 
those traditional resources cherished by Maori. 
B Recognition of Maori values 
On a broader scale, Hingston J's judgement in favour of Te Ihu Iwi provides a recent 
recognition of the current trend towards acknowledgement of Maori values by the 
legislature, the judiciary and the Treaty of Waitangi. 123 
1 Te Ture Whenua Maori Land Act 1993 
The recent enactment of Te Ture Whenua Maori Land Act 1993 demonstrates 
Parliament's concern to preserve Maori values. The Act recognises the possibility of 
customary title to land and the importance of restoring the relationship between Maori 
people and their ancestral lands. The purpose of the Act is to promote the "retention of 
Maori land and General Land owned by the Maori in the hands of its owners." 124 The 
decision in favour of restoring jurisdiction to the Maori Land Court to investigate title to 
the foreshore in Marlborough Sounds supports the protection extended to Maori interests 
in the Act. 
2 The Resource Management Act 1991 
The decision in Marlborough Sounds supports the statutory protection and promotion of 
Maori values found in the Maori provisions of the Resource Management Act 1991. 125 A 
number of recent cases which have dealt with Maori issues and the manner in which 
Maori interests are considered under the Resource Management Act 1991, illustrate the 
trend towards recognition of the spiritual and physical relationship Maori has with land in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. The cases illuminate the mechanisms in the Act for the 
122 S 2 Resource Management defines "Kaitiakitanga" as the "exercise of guardianship; and, in relation to a 
resource, includes the ethic of stewardship based on the nature of the resource itself'. However, this 
definition is regarded by Maori as a mistranslation. Kirsten Maynard (Guest speaker at a Maori Customary 
Law lecture, Victoria University Law School, 18 August 1998) suggests the tenn can be defined as "respect 
for who you are". Kirsten quoted a comment made by Tau Henare that the Resource Management 
definition was incorrect, as kaitiakitanga was" not stewardship, since this means in English 'to guard 
someone elses property' with overtones of a master-servant relationship." 
123 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General, above n 55, brought life to the Treaty principles. 
Statutory inclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi is extensive. See Brooker 's Resource Management Law above 
n 66, TW 11 for a table of the Acts incorporating the Treaty, for example: Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 
established the Waitangi Tribunal the Treaty is referred to throughout the Act, Te Ture Whenua Maori 
Land Act 1993 provides for the return of Maori land to Maori, ss 9 and 27 of the State-owned Enterprises 
Act 1986, s 4 Conservation Act 1987, s 8 Resource Management Act 1991, s 4 Crown Minerals Act 1991. 
Hingston J himself made note of the direction Treaty jurisprudence has taken in the last decade which has 
paid regard to the interest of Maori . 
124 Te Ture Whenua Maori Land Act 1993, Preamble. 
125 These include s8 which provides: "Treaty of Waitangi- In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons 
exercising functions and powers under it, inrelation to managing the use, development, and protection of 
natural and physical resources, shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Teriti O 
Waitangi). S 6(e) provides that "the relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their 
ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga" is a matter of national importance. 
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protection of Maori values and the extent to which these have been employed, proving 
that New Zealand Courts are taking a robust approach to interpreting the Act to ensure 
h h M · · · · l ffi 126 t at t ese aon prov1s10ns are given some rea e ect. 
In Aqua King (Anakoha Bay) v Marlbrough District Counci/127 the Environmental Court 
refused to validate an application for a coastal permit for marine farming in Anakoha 
Bay, the traditional home of the Ngati Kuia. Judge Kenderdine J identified the duty to 
avoid, remedy or mitigate any adverse effects on the cultural conditions pertaining to 
iwi 128 under s 5 RMA and held that restrictions on the ability of Ngati Kuia to exercise 
kaitiakitanga would constitute such an effect. Kenderdine J decided in favour of the 
foreseeable needs of iwi. 
Minhinnick v Watercare Services Ltd 129involved an appeal to the High Court challenging 
an Environmental Court decision declining to grant an interim enforcement order haltin~ 
works relating to a proposed sewer pipeline through the Matukuturua Stonefields. 13 
Salmon J decided to refer the matter back to the Environmental Court in order to ensure 
the proposed sewer pipeline was not offensive or objectionable in Maori terms under s 
314 of the Act. The case is significant in that it provides an example of the High Court 
placing great importance on the protection of Maori cultural well being. 131 
TV3 Network Services Ltd v Waikato District Council 132 resulted in a refusal by the High 
Court to reverse a decision by the Environment Court that a resource consent 133would 
offend Maori heritage and waahi tapu. The case is another example of the growing 
recognition given to Maori values. Hammond J supported the conclusion made by the 
Environmental Court that any proposal must accord with the strong direction of s 6(e) 134 
and enable the tangata whenua to provide for their social and cultural well being. 135 
The above cases all give strong contemporary authority for the current proactive stance in 
the protection of Maori interests. Marlborough Sounds can be seen as a continuation of 
this growing trend, with the effect of instilling further confidence in Maori that their 
culture and traditions will continue to be recognised and provided for as a matter of 
national importance. 
126 The following analysis is based on an article by Beverley, Paul. "The RMA and the Protection of Maori 
Interests- Recent Developments." Resource Management Bulletin, Issue 7 ,2 BRMB,76. 
127 Environmental Court, W 71 /97, 30 June 1997. 
128 Cultural conditions pertaining to lwi are encompassed by the definition of 'environment' ins 5(2) of the 
Resource Management Act 1991. 
129 High Court, Auckland HC 86/97, 3 September 1997, Salmon J. 
130 The Stonefields area is regarded as waahi tapu by iwi and there is liklihood that the land contains bones 
and other remains of Maori interred there many generations ago. 
131 
Protection of Maori well being is provided for in Part II of the Resource Management Act 1991 and is a 
valuable demonstration of the variety of mechanisms in the Act which are applicable to Maori. 
132 High Court, Hamilton AP 55/97, 5 September 1997, Hammond J. 
133 The consent was granted to TV 3 to instill a television translator on Horea Hill. 
134 ( ) s 6 e Resource Management Act 1991. 
135 
The High Court noted Tainui's metaphysical and spiritual approach to the land, the loss of which would 
be 'culturally debilitating' and 'could never be justified on the basis of economic advancement. 
• 
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C Recognition of customary title 
Marlborough Sounds is also significant for Maori in that it provides domestic recognition 
of the international trend towards acknowledgement of customary aboriginal title. 136 
Hingston J supported the high thresholds which are required to extinguish Native title by 
legislative or executive action set out in Mabo v Queensland137 and The Wik People v The 
State of Queensland and Others etc 138 and warned against the extinguishment of 
customary rights by a 'side wind'. He commented that recourse to the reasoning in these 
cases was both 'desirable and helpful' 139 in coming to his conclusions. Furthermore, 
Hingston J took time to encourage Parliament to secure the recognition of customary title 
by legislative action: 
"recent authorities both in other jurisdictions and New Zealand spell out 
the need that confiscatory legislation in this field must clearly and 
unequivocally deal with extinguishment; it must be part of or one of the 
purposes of an enactment that extinguishment is intended; significantly 
Faulkner suggests that where there is extinguishment without consent of 
Maori (in time of peace) compensation should be paid." 140 
With these comments Hingston J offers Maori a certain confidence that their customary 
rights will not be lightly disregarded in the future. 
X CONCLUSION 
The potentially explosive Maori Land Court decision in Marlborough Sounds has sent 
disturbing ripples throughout New Zealand. The decision has startled the public of New 
Zealand, and raised eyebrows and tempers in legal, political and academic circles. The 
importance of the case for all New Zealanders, Maori and non- Maori alike, should not be 
underestimated or ignored. Whilst the decision by Hingston J reflects the current trend 
towards recognition of customary rights of Maori to their ancestral lands, all the potential 
outcomes for the Crown are undesirable. The Crown is possibly left stripped of all legal 
claims to the foreshore and left with the prospect of making time-consuming amendments 
to those statutes premised on the assumption that the foreshore is public property vested 
in the Crown. Likewise the implications for the New Zealand public are equally 
unattractive. The coastline is an important part of New Zealand life. To see the foreshore 
barricaded off would be intolerable and a diminution of valuable rights which all New 
Zealanders have long taken for granted. 
136 In "Foreshore appeal disturbs" ,above n 2, 9, Dr Williams commented that "Customary land rights are 
becoming increasingly important in a number of countries, including New Zealand, and should be 
resolved." It was also noted that "In Australia, the hugely important Mabo and Wik High Court cases found 
that native Aborigine title could exist on vacant Crown land and on occupied pastoral lease land. In Canada 
last year, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision that native Indian rights to a resource-rich land 
were not invalidated by European settlement". 
13 7 b / Ma o1no 2) above n 38. 
138 The Wik People v State of Queensland and Others etc. [ 1996] 187 CLR 1. 
139 Jn re the Marlborough Sounds foreshore and Seabed, above, n 13, 11. 
140 h Jn re t e Marlborough Sounds foreshore and Seabed, above, no 13 , 11 . 
.. 
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Although the case is currently on appeal, it is suggested an overruling of Hingston J's 
decision could not in itself resolve these concerns and preserve the Crown's title and 
public rights to the foreshore. Arguably, Parliament should have acted a long time ago in 
order to avoid the current confusion and uncertainty of the law relating to the foreshore. 
The present author wishes to see respect afforded to the sacred nature of the coastline. 
Furthermore, those who have the required authority need to take on the responsibility to 
avoid further threats to the foreshore and public rights in order to change this state of 
affairs which is unacceptable in the national interest. 
.. 
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